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RECOGNITION OF THE 
ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL IN CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS: KRIEGER 




After the release of Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta,1 commentary on the 
case focused on the fact that Crown Attorneys, like all other lawyers, could be 
subject to discipline by provincial Law Societies in the event of professional 
misconduct.2 While it is true that Krieger clearly established that provinces had 
the constitutional power to regulate Crown Attorneys to some extent, what is 
most interesting about the case, from a constitutional law perspective, is its 
examination of how Crown Attorneys, as agents of the Attorney General, are 
unlike any other lawyers. Although hinted at in earlier decisions,3 in Krieger, 
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized, for the first time, that the 
independence of the Attorney General in the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion is a principle of Canadian constitutional law.  
Prior to Krieger various commentators noted that the office of the Attorney 
General has constitutional dimensions. Professor John Ll. Edwards, an 
academic expert in the area, wrote that the Attorney General has “a privileged 
                                                                                                                                                              
  Lori Sterling is the Director of the Crown Law Office — Civil, Ontario Ministry of the At-
torney General. 
  Heather Mackay is Counsel with the Crown Law Office — Civil, Ontario Ministry of the 
Attorney General. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the 
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General. 
1
  2002 S.C.C. 65. 
2
  See “Crowns Subject to Law Society Discipline,” Law Times, October 21, 2002; “SCC 
Sets Rules for Law Societies Disciplining Crowns,” Lawyer’s Weekly, November 8, 2002; Alberta 
Crown Attorneys’ Criminal Case Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 17, October 10, 2002; “SCC Rules on 
Jurisdiction of Alberta Law Society and Prosecutorial Discretion,” The Continuing Legal Education 
Society of British Columbia; “Law Society Entitled to Review Ethics of Crown Prosecutor,” Great 
Library Digests, October 15, 2002; G. Hately, Law Society Oversight of Prosecutorial Behaviour 
(2002). 
3
  See Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170; R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326; R. v. 
Power, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601. 
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constitutional status”4 and enjoys “immense constitutional powers.”5 Chief 
Justice Wells of the Ontario High Court stated “there has existed in the U.K. 
and thus in Canada a constitutional discretion in the Attorney General.”6 
Supreme Court Justice Ian Binnie has remarked that the independence of the 
Attorney General is a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the 
Charter.7 And Ian Scott, former Attorney General of Ontario, declared that the 
“absolute immunity of the Attorney General on questions of prosecution policy 
is accepted as an important constitutional principle.”8 However, it was not until 
Krieger that the Supreme Court expressly entrenched the independence of the 
Attorney General within the Canadian Constitution when it observed: 
It is a constitutional principle that the Attorneys General of this country must act 
independently of partisan concerns when exercising their delegated sovereign au-
thority to initiate, continue or terminate prosecutions.9 
This paper will examine the independence of the modern office of the 
Attorney General and its agents Crown Attorneys, and how this concept 
evolved both as a matter of convention and constitutional law. With emphasis 
on the Krieger decision, the meaning and scope of “prosecutorial discretion” 
will also be explored. In order to further determine the nature of independence 
and prosecutorial discretion, the independence of the Attorney General will be 
compared to judicial independence and the independence of statutory tribunals. 
Finally, potential implications of the Krieger decision will be canvassed.  
I.  EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
The office of the Attorney General has evolved to include two distinctive 
functions: the “political” Attorney General, who, as an elected member of the 
legislature and member of Cabinet, is a member of the Executive branch of the 
government of the day and thus plays a role in formulating government policy; 
and the “chief law officer of the Crown” charged with providing legal advice to 
government and directing criminal and civil litigation and ensuring it is con-
                                                                                                                                                              
4
  J. Edwards, The Attorney General, Politics and the Public Interest, (London: 1984), at 360 
[hereinafter “Edwards, Politics”]. 
5
 J. Edwards, “The Attorney General and the Charter of Rights,” in Charter Litigation, R. 
Sharpe, ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987), at 68 [hereinafter “Edwards, Charter”]. 
6
  Re The Queen v. Conn Stafford Smythe, 70 DTC 6382, Sup. Crt. of Ont., December 
10, 1970, at 12. 
7
  R. v. Regan, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, at paras. 157-58. 
8
  I. Scott, “The Role of the Attorney General and the Charter of Rights,” in Charter Cases 
1986-1987, G.A. Beaudoin, ed. (Cowansville: 1987) at 133 [hereinafter “Scott, Charter”]. 
9
  Krieger, supra, note 1, at para. 3. 
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ducted in accordance with the public interest. John Ll. Edwards believed these 
were opposing roles — that the political responsibilities of the Attorney Gen-
eral might impede his or her ability to carry out the legal responsibilities of the 
office independent of partisan concerns. This concern may be largely academic, 
however, as it is now widely accepted, and expected, that in his or her role as 
chief law officer to the Crown, the Attorney General must put aside the partisan 
considerations of the political Attorney General and exercise independence 
from Cabinet and the government. 
1. History of the Office of the Attorney General 
The original federal and provincial legislation, which created the office of 
the Attorney General in various Canadian jurisdictions, expressly conferred the 
powers and duties that traditionally belonged to the Attorney General of Eng-
land on the Canadian office-holders.10 
As early as the 13th century, the King of England entrusted a barrister, the 
“King’s Attorney,” to supervise his legal interests throughout the country. The 
role of this Attorney evolved over the centuries and came to include the right to 
initiate and terminate prosecutions, (the majority of which were still brought 
privately). This right remains one of the most important powers of the modern 
Attorney General.11 
The English colonies founded in the Maritimes and Upper Canada adopted 
the British legal system (with some modifications) and thus each established an 
office of the Attorney General. However, from the beginning, the Canadian 
Attorney General took a far greater role in prosecutions than in Britain. For 
example, Upper Canada established a system of Crown Attorneys in 1857, 
more than 20 years before a similar system was developed in England.12 
The modern office of the Attorney General continued to take shape as the 
result of the union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1840 and an 1846 report on 
the administration of justice in the Province of Canada.13 After the union, the 
Attorney General’s main responsibility was to conduct the Crown’s business 
before courts and to advise Cabinet colleagues on legal matters. When the 
Attorney General or Solicitor General was unable to appear in court they could 
instruct counsel, usually Queen’s Counsel, to appear as their representative.14 
                                                                                                                                                              
10
  P. Stenning, Appearing for the Crown (Cowansville: 1986), at 72-75 and 79-87. 
11
  Law Reform Commission of Canada, Controlling Criminal Prosecutions: The Attorney 
General and the Crown Prosecutor, Working Paper 62, 1990, at 3 [hereinafter “LRC”].  
12
  M. Bloos, The Public Prosecutions Model from Upper Canada, (1989) 32 C.L.Q. 69, as 
cited in LRC, at 3. 
13
  Stenning, supra, note 10, at 64-68. 
14
  Id., at 64-68. 
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The office of the Attorney General continued this way until Confederation in 
1867. Unlike most modern constitutions within the British Commonwealth, the 
British North America Act was “somewhat less than explicit in stating the legal 
foundations on which the posers and functions of the Canadian office of the 
Attorney General … is said to rest.”15 Nevertheless, the office did receive some 
attention in the Constitution Act, 1867. Sections 9 and 11 provide that executive 
authority remains vested in the Queen, and that the Queen is advised by an 
executive council comprised of people appointed by the Governor General, 
although it did not specify who those people should be. However, the first 
council did include the Attorney General.16 
The Act was more clear regarding the role of the provincial Attorneys Gen-
eral. Pursuant to sections 34 and 63, the Attorney General is among the list of 
executive officers initially included on the executive councils of Ontario and 
Quebec. Additionally section 135 provides that the “rights, powers, duties, 
functions, responsibilities or authorities” vested or imposed on the Attorney 
General prior to Confederation continue, until otherwise provided by the legis-
lature.  
Also relevant to the role of the Attorney General were the division of powers 
concerning the administration of justice. Section 91(27) gave the federal gov-
ernment exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure, while section 
92(14) gave the provincial governments jurisdiction over the administration of 
justice, constitution of the criminal and civil courts, and civil procedure. In 
practical terms, this division of powers meant that the federal Attorney General 
and his or her agents prosecuted federal statutory offences, with the exception 
of offences under the Criminal Code, which were conducted by provincial 
Attorneys General and their agents in addition to the prosecution of provincial 
“quasi-criminal” offences.17 
After Confederation, the federal government and provinces enacted legisla-
tion creating and defining the office of the Attorney General (in some provinces 
called the Minister of Justice). Although again based on the British model, the 
Canadian office of the Attorney General was significantly different than that in 
Britain, where the Attorney General was not a member of the Cabinet and had 
much more limited responsibilities. Pursuant to An Act Respecting the Depart-
ment of Justice,18 passed in 1868, the federal Attorney General was given re-
sponsibility for prosecutions, providing legal advice to government, 
administering the courts, and supervising the police, prisons, and penitentiaries, 
                                                                                                                                                              
15
  Edwards, Politics, supra, note 4, at 356. 
16
  The first Attorney General of Canada, John. A. MacDonald, was also the Prime Minister. 
17
  LRC, supra, note 11, at 6. 
18
  S.C. 1868, c. 39. 
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in addition to the political responsibilities of the Minister of Justice. In 1966, 
responsibility for the RCMP and the prisons was given to the Solicitor General. 
With this exception, the responsibilities of the federal Attorney General have 
remained the same since 1868.19  
Today, the division of responsibilities concerning the criminal justice system 
varies to some degree across the provinces but most mirror the federal model. 
The exception is Nova Scotia, where the operational and political functions of 
the Attorney General were expressly severed by the creation of the office of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (D.P.P.) in 1990.20 The D.P.P., a deputy of the 
Attorney General, heads the public prosecution service and is mandated to 
ensure that prosecutions in the province are conducted independent of the 
Attorney General’s direction and in a non-partisan manner.21 Nevertheless, the 
Attorney General maintains “superintendence” over prosecutions. The D.P.P. 
and the Attorney General may consult with one another on policy issues or 
even in respect to a particular prosecution. However, the D.P.P. is required to 
comply with the Attorney General’s instructions or guidelines only if they are 
issued in writing and published in the Royal Gazette or the D.P.P.’s Annual 
Report — in other words, the Attorney General may only intervene if he or she 
                                                                                                                                                              
19
  It is noteworthy that the combined responsibilities of the federal Canadian Attorney Gen-
eral and Solicitor General are divided among five different positions in England: two are members 
of the Cabinet, the Home Secretary who is responsible for the police, Crown Prosecution Service 
and prisons, and the Lord Chancellor who is responsible for the administration of the courts, 
judicial appointments and legal services such as legal aid; two are Law Officers who are govern-
ment Ministers, but not members of the Cabinet: the Attorney General and Solicitor General; and 
the last is the Director of Public Prosecutions, who reports to the Attorney General and is responsi-
ble for ensuring the independence of criminal prosecutions. 
20
  The new delineation of prosecutorial functions in Nova Scotia was the result of recom-
mendations made by the Commissioners of the Inquiry into the Wrongful Conviction of Donald 
Marshall, who adopted some of the ideas presented by John Ll. Edwards in his report to the inquiry 
entitled “Walking the Tightrope of Justice: an examination of the Office of the Attorney General.” 
The change was seen as a way to avoid some of the conduct demonstrated by Crown prosecutors 
and police involved in the Marshall prosecution. The creation of the office of the D.P.P. was 
preceded by the creation of the Solicitor General’s Ministry in 1987, which was given responsibil-
ity for policing and corrections. However, in 1993, the Solicitor General’s Ministry and the Minis-
try of the Attorney General were merged, bringing responsibility for criminal prosecutions, 
policing, corrections, court operations and the D.P.P. under one Ministry. Some critics allege this 
undermines the independence of the D.P.P. See Bruce P. Archibald, “The Politics of Prosecutorial 
Discretion: Institutional Structures and the Tensions Between Punitive and Restorative Paradigms 
of Justice” (1998) 3 Can. Crim. Law Rev. 69, at 76. 
21
  The D.P.P.’s independence from the Attorney General is said to be secured by the non-
partisan consultation process which occurs prior to the D.P.P.’s appointment, his or her security of 
tenure, his or her status as a deputy minister with authority to hire or dismiss members of the public 
prosecution service, his or her salary, which is equal to the Chief Judge of the Provincial Court, as 
well as the right and duty to prepare an annual report for the Legislative Assembly.  
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is willing to “go public” regarding the intervention.22 Political accountability 
for prosecutions remains with the Attorney General who is answerable to the 
Legislative Assembly and the public. 
While the Nova Scotia system is a novel attempt in Canada to maintain 
independence in prosecutorial discretion, it is not without its critics.23 The 
prosecution of the owners and managers of the Westray Mine illustrated a 
potential problem with this system. In this case, despite his power to intervene, 
the Attorney General of Nova Scotia chose not to. It was therefore the D.P.P. 
that bore much of the criticism from the victims’ families instead of the more 
politically accountable Attorney General.24 
2. The Attorney General’s Independence from Political  
Influence 
It has been recognized in Britain since the early 1900s that the Attorney 
General cannot take direction from Cabinet in matters of prosecutorial discre-
tion, although he or she may consult or advise Cabinet in such matters. The 
appropriate relationship between Cabinet and the Attorney General was articu-
lated in 1951 by Lord Shawcross, while he was Attorney General of England: 
I think the true doctrine is that it is the duty of an Attorney General, in deciding 
whether or not to authorize the prosecution, to acquaint himself with all the rele-
vant facts, including, for instance, the effect which the prosecution, successful or 
unsuccessful as the case may be, would have upon public morale and order, and 
with any other consideration affecting public policy. In order so to inform himself, 
he may, although I do not think he is obliged to, consult with any of his colleagues 
in the government and indeed, as Lord Simon once said, he would in some cases be 
a fool if he did not. On the other hand, the assistance of his colleagues is confined 
to informing him of particular considerations which might affect his own decision, 
and does not consist, in telling him what that decision ought to be. The responsibil-
ity for the eventual decision rests with the Attorney General, and he is not to be put, 
and is not put, under pressure by his colleagues in the matter. Nor, of course, can 
the Attorney General shift his responsibility for making the decision on to the 
shoulders of his colleagues. If political considerations which in the broad sense that 
                                                                                                                                                              
22
  Archibald, supra, note 20, at 77. 
23
  Id., at 77. 
24
  As noted by Archibald, id., at 98:  
The Attorney General must be supportive of the D.P.P.’s policies in general terms and 
be prepared to state this support publicly, otherwise the notion of accountability becomes a 
sham and the system will eventually fall into disrepute. If the D.P.P. is consistently used as 
a political scapegoat, the office will soon suffer irreparably. 
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I have indicated affect government in the abstract arise it is the Attorney General, 
applying his judicial mind, who has to be the sole judge of those considerations.25 
As noted by one commentator, it is difficult to find the legal basis for the 
right of the Attorney General to act independently as asserted by Lord 
Shawcross. Nevertheless, in England it was accepted as a matter of conven-
tion.26  
The legal source of the independence of the Attorney General in Canada is 
equally unclear. In colonial times the Attorney General was a private lawyer 
retained by the government, and therefore would not have considered that he 
had or was entitled to independence from the government of the day. This 
situation continued with the union of Canada East and Canada West as the 
Attorneys General and Solicitors General of the new province were required to 
hold seats in Parliament and to take part in political affairs. Moreover, govern-
ment leaders frequently also acted as Attorney General. This combination of 
functions continued with Confederation as John A. MacDonald served as both 
Prime Minister and Attorney General from 1867 to 1873.  
It was not until 1978, over a century after Confederation, that the 
“Shawcross” principle — the independence of the Attorney General from polit-
ical influence — was explicitly recognized in Canada. In a statement to the 
House of Commons discussing the principles that guided him in his exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, Ron Basford, then Attorney General of Canada stated: 
The first principle, in my view, is that there must be excluded any consideration 
based upon narrow partisan views, or based upon the political consequences to me 
or to others. 
In arriving at a decision on such a sensitive issue as this, the Attorney General is 
entitled to seek information and advice from others but in no way is he directed by 
his colleagues in the government or by parliament itself.27 
Professor John Ll. Edwards has commented that this was not always the 
case: the evidence of previous administrations, irrespective of party affiliations, 
suggests that earlier Prime Ministers and Attorneys General did not view inde-
pendence as necessary to the role of the Attorney General, and decisions in 
highly political cases were often made by the Cabinet and carried out by the 
Attorney General. 
                                                                                                                                                              
25
  J. Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1964) at 223. 
26
  G. Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability 
(Oxford: 1984) at 112, as cited in LRC, supra, note 11, at 6. 
27
  The Attorney General was discussing whether to lay charges under the Official Secrets Act 
against a Member of Parliament and The Toronto Sun newspaper, in connection with an article 
based on an RCMP report on the Russian intelligence services. 
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Although the Attorney General is independent from Cabinet or political in-
fluence, it should be noted that the Attorney General is accountable to Parlia-
ment or the appropriate legislature for his or her decisions — “accountable 
politically but also aloof from partisan politics” as it was stated by the former 
Attorney General of Ontario, and current Chief Justice of Ontario, Roy 
McMurtry.28 It is quite open to the members of Parliament to question the 
Attorney General about prosecutorial decisions. However, as noted by the Law 
Reform Commission of Canada, this accountability “must be considered in the 
context of the reality that party solidarity would lead to the support of the At-
torney General, whether independent in decision making or not.”29 
3. The Attorney General and Legal Advice to Government  
One of the Attorney General’s main duties as chief law officer of the Crown 
is to provide legal advice to government. The duty of the Attorney General to 
act independently is no less important in this regard. Any advice to government 
has to be a “balanced, impartial and accurate analysis of the law,” and inde-
pendent of partisan political considerations.30 In the rare instances where 
private sector lawyers are consulted, the ultimate advice flows through the 
Attorney General or his or her agents.31 Although, ultimately, Cabinet may not 
like or choose to follow the Attorney General’s legal advice, the Attorney 
General is required to give it independent of partisan considerations.32 
The Attorney General must also “bring the focus of justice to questions of 
politics” and “bring a particular concern for principle, constitutionalism and 
rights to his [or her] policy making function.”33 That is, when the Attorney 
General functions in his or her “political” role and participates in making gov-
ernment policy, he or she must also demonstrate a measure of independence 
and object to unprincipled solutions to problems.  
                                                                                                                                                              
28
  R. McMurtry, “The Office of the Attorney General” in The Cambridge Lectures, D. 
Mendes da Costa, ed. (Butterworths: Toronto, 1981), at 2. 
29
  LRC, supra, note 11, at 11. 
30
 M. Frieman, Deputy Attorney General of Ontario, Remarks at the 2001 Constitutional 
Cases Conference, April 12, 2002, at 7.  
31
  The Attorney General does not disclose the contents of legal advice due to solicitor-client 
privilege and respect for individual privacy. Nevertheless, prior to legislation being introduced, it is 
typically vetted by civil lawyers employed by the Ministry of the Attorney General. 
32
  Edwards, Charter, supra, note 5, at 9. 
33
  I. Scott, “Law, Policy, and the Role of the Attorney General: Constancy and Change in the 
1980’s” (Spring 1989) 39 U.T.L.J. 109-126, at 119-120 [hereinafter “Scott, Law Policy”]. 
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4. The Attorney General and Litigation  
In his or her role as the superintendent of criminal and civil litigation, the At-
torney General must ensure that his or her decisions are not only free from 
political influence, but are also based on the rule of law and the public interest. 
In the sphere of criminal law, the Attorney General’s independence or “prose-
cutorial discretion” includes the ability to decide whether or not to prosecute an 
individual that has been charged by the police. This decision must be an objec-
tive one, based on the circumstances of the case. As expressed by the former 
Attorney General of Ontario, Ian Scott: 
[I]n determining whether or not to prosecute … the attorney general must be guided 
solely by considerations that are independent of his affiliation with a political party 
or the government. His decision must be based on his best assessment of what the 
law and the public confidence in it require. This necessarily follows from his role 
as the chief law officer of the state where that state policy is based on the rule of 
law. The confidence of the public administration of justice prohibits the use of the 
criminal law for partisan purposes. Moreover, as a guardian of the public interest, 
the attorney general must act in accordance with the interests of those whom the 
government represents, and not simply in the interest of the government to which 
he belongs.34 
As a practical matter, prosecutorial discretion is most often exercised by the 
Attorney General’s agents, Crown Attorneys. Crown Attorneys not only derive 
their prosecutorial discretion from the Attorney General but must also exercise 
it in the same independent way.35 The fact that the decision to prosecute must 
be made independently, however, does not mean that certain kinds of socio-
political factors are not brought to bear on the decision-making process. In his 
or her role as the protector of the public interest, an Attorney General can con-
sider the social repercussions of the decision to prosecute and the guidelines 
they issue to Crown Attorneys. Further, these decisions may be determined 
after consultation with Cabinet colleagues. However, the ultimate decision must 
be that of the Attorney General alone, and “must be for the public good, and not 
for the good of the government of the day.”36 
                                                                                                                                                              
34
 Id., at 112. 
35
  LRC, supra, note 11, at 15. 
36
  Scott, Law Policy, supra, note 33, at 121. The considerations that apply to the decision to 
prosecute are similar to those that apply to the actual conduct of a criminal prosecution, where the 
role of the Crown prosecutor has been described as that of a “minister of justice.” As stated by 
Rand J. in R. v. Boucher, [1955] S.C.R. 16, at 23-24: 
It cannot be overemphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain 
a conviction, it is to lay before the jury what the Crown considers credible evidence relevant 
to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of 
facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength but it must 
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When a provincial government is involved in civil, as opposed to criminal 
litigation, an Attorney General may, and often does, take a far more active role. 
This role includes issuing instructions to civil Crown Attorneys on positions to 
be taken in court or when settlement is appropriate. Typically, civil Crown 
counsel act as the Attorney General’s agents in defending lawsuits involving 
torts or contracts, or Charter challenges. The Attorney General may also act as 
a plaintiff to recover damages. Far less frequently, the Attorney General exer-
cises wider authority to seek an injunction on behalf of the public interest to 
enforce public legal rights such as enjoining a public nuisance.37 This “public 
interest standing” can also be used to intervene in litigation that raises im-
portant public or Charter issues.38 The Attorney General is also provided with 
notice of all judicial reviews and constitutional challenges in the province and 
is entitled to intervene in those proceedings.39  
The marked difference between the role of the Attorney General in criminal 
and civil litigation was explored by Ian Scott.40 In addition to the existence of a 
convention of independence in criminal matters, Scott noted that the distin-
guishing factor between criminal and civil litigation is one of legislative re-
sponsibility. When prosecuting a criminal case, a provincial Crown Attorney is 
not prosecuting a law that the provincial government has made or a law for 
                                                                                                                                                              
also be done fairly. The role of the prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his 
function is a matter of public duty that which in civil life there can be none charged with 
greater personal responsibility. 
37
  For example, consider the involvement of the Ontario Attorney General in R. v. 
Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. Although Dr. Morgentaler and his colleagues were acquitted at 
trial, the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned that decision, and the accused appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Canada. While the case was waiting to be heard, the Toronto police again charged 
the doctors with the same offence. Although, as Ian Scott notes, they certainly had reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe the offence was being committed, there were other things that had to be 
considered. The Ontario High Court of Justice had held that it would not proceed with any further 
trial of the accused while their appeal was pending before the Supreme Court (Campbell v. Ontario 
(Attorney General) (1987), 60 O.R. (2d) 617 (C.A.)). Moreover, given that the facts supporting the 
new charges and the defence raised would likely be identical to that of the charges on which they 
had been tried and acquitted, it was, in Scott’s opinion, prudent to hold the prosecution in abeyance 
until the Supreme Court released its judgment, and thus the charges were stayed. See Scott, Law 
Policy, supra, note 33, at 117-18. 
38
  For example, s. 122 of the Ontario Courts of Justice Act S.O. 1984, c. 11, required that the 
Attorney General be notified and given the opportunity to participate in litigation challenging the 
constitutionality of an Ontario statute, [as does s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 
C.43] see Scott, Charter, supra, note 8, at 137.  
39
  Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. J.1, s. 9(4) and Courts of Justice Act, 
R.S.O. 1990 c. C.43, s. 109. 
40
  Scott, Law Policy, supra, note 33, at 116 and 124-25.  
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which it has legislative responsibility.41 However, civil litigation involves 
provincial statutes or acts for which the Attorney General has responsibility. In 
this case, Scott wrote that it was appropriate for the Attorney General to be 
more activist and interventionist, as civil matters were within his or her respon-
sibility and may be a reflection of a particular government policy. Nevertheless, 
Scott cautioned that civil litigation must still be approached from a principled 
perspective — the Crown’s position must be consistent and uniform, and in 
accordance with the law, regardless of policy preferences.42 
Scott’s theory is a partial answer to the question of why an Attorney General 
approaches criminal and civil litigation differently. It does not, however, reflect 
the reality that while Criminal Code prosecutions are federal matters, they can 
vary to a certain degree from province to province as a result of policy choices 
by particular provincial governments. For example, the protocol for dealing 
with cases involving domestic abuse may be nuanced from province to prov-
ince; or the prosecution of young offenders may vary from province to province 
depending on the comprehensiveness of criminal diversion programs.43 A pro-
vincial Attorney General may also intervene in certain criminal matters by 
seeking an injunction in relation to a Criminal Code provision. For example, 
where a statutory penalty does not appear to be acting as a deterrent, and there 
is a continual flouting of the law, a court may grant the Attorney General an 
injunction to aid in the enforcement of the law. This has been attempted on 
several occasions in an effort to curb street prostitution.44 Scott’s explanation 
also fails to address regulatory or other “quasi-criminal” prosecutions under 
provincial statutes in which the Attorney General will typically not issue in-
structions despite the fact that the provincial government maintains legislative 
responsibility for the statute under which the charges are laid. 
Another explanation may rest in the role of the Attorney General. In criminal 
matters, the Crown prosecutor’s view of how the administration of justice will 
                                                                                                                                                              
41
  For example, in Scott’s opinion, if an Attorney General believes that a Criminal Code 
provision under which it prosecutes is unconstitutional, it must defer to the judgment of the federal 
government that the law is constitutional and continue the prosecution. In the event of a court 
challenge, it is then the federal government that should have the responsibility for defending the 
provision.  
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  Frieman, supra, note 30, at 7.  
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  Sections 8 and 23 of the new Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1, allow provincial 
governments to set up programs which allow authorities to issue cautions to young offenders 
instead of instituting judicial proceedings, and to screen charges against young offenders before 
they are laid. However, provinces are not required to set up such programs. See Bala, Youth Crimi-
nal Justice Law (Irwin Law: 2003).  
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  See J. Berryman, The Law of Equitable Remedies (Irwin Law: 2000), at 135-36. 
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be served in a particular case must be free from extraneous influences.45 In civil 
matters however, the Attorney General and his or her agents typically act as the 
government’s “spokesperson,” reflecting the government’s position or policy 
objective in a particular matter. Yet a further explanation may lie in the severity 
of the consequences for the party opposite the Crown. The principle of prosecu-
torial discretion is followed in criminal and quasi-criminal matters because of 
the possibility of incarceration upon conviction. In contrast, civil matters typi-
cally result in damages or discipline. Not one of these explanations for the 
unique role of the Attorney General in criminal matters provides a complete 
answer but cumulatively, they do provide a compelling rationale for the inde-
pendence principle. 
In R. v. Power, the Supreme Court held that the independence of the Attor-
ney General in prosecutorial decision-making includes independence from 
judicial scrutiny. The Court noted that this was a function of the respect for the 
rule of law and the separation of powers between the three branches of gov-
ernment — the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. As criminal law is, 
and thus prosecutorial decisions are, within the domain of the executive, it is 
not normally within the ambit of the courts’ powers to interfere in such mat-
ters.46 
Nevertheless, courts do maintain a discretion to remedy an abuse of the 
court’s process and as such, can review prosecutorial conduct, including discre-
tionary decisions. Power made it clear, however, that courts should be very 
reluctant to question prosecutors’ decisions: 
[T]he Attorney General is a member of the executive and as such reflects, through 
his or her prosecutorial function, the interest of the community to see that justice is 
properly done. The Attorney General’s role in this regard is not only to protect the 
public, but also to honour and express the community’s sense of justice. Accord-
ingly, courts should be careful before they attempt to “second-guess” the prosecu-
tor’s motives when he or she makes a decision. Where there is conspicuous 
evidence of improper motives or of bad faith or of an act so wrong that it violates 
the conscience of the community, such that it would genuinely be unfair or inde-
cent to proceed, then and only then, should courts intervene to prevent an abuse of 
process which could bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Cases of this 
nature will be extremely rare.47 
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  In Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at para. 80, the Su-
preme Court described the role of the Crown in criminal matters as the “singular antagonist,” 
compared with the Crown’s role in civil matters where it is more mediation minded. 
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  [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, at para. 29. 
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Although the number of abuse of process cases before the courts has 
increased in recent years, the high threshold set in Power has generally been 
upheld. Where it can be shown that the right to a fair trial has been prejudiced, 
courts will generally grant a remedy, most often a stay of proceedings. 
However, in cases where there is some evidence of an abuse of process that 
does not go to the fairness of the trial (the “residual” category of abuse of 
process), courts have been far more reluctant to grant a remedy under section 
24(1) of the Charter, and particularly a stay of proceedings.48 
The scope of prosecutorial discretion, and what constitutes Crown 
misconduct, continues to receive considerable judicial attention in the context 
of malicious prosecutions actions against Crown Attorneys. In these cases, as 
demonstrated in Nelles v. Ontario49 and more recently in Proulx v. Quebec 
(Attorney General),50 courts continue to afford prosecutorial decision-making a 
high level of deference.51  
Prior to Nelles, Crown Attorneys in some provinces were immune from suits 
for malicious prosecution. However, Lamer J. (as he then was) found that this 
immunity was contrary to public policy as it negated a private right of action 
and therefore a remedy for those who were maliciously prosecuted. It was also 
Lamer J.’s view that people who were maliciously prosecuted would experi-
ence a violation of their section 7 Charter rights, and that absolute immunity 
would prevent such a person from seeking a remedy under section 24(1).52 
Nonetheless, the Court in Nelles placed “a formidable burden” on plaintiffs 
bringing malicious prosecution actions. He or she must prove a prosecutor did 
not have reasonable and probable grounds for initiating or continuing the pro-
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  See D. MacAlister, “Does the Residual Category for Abuse of Process Still Exist?” 
(1999), 28 C.R. (5th) 72; N. Gorham, “Regan: The Residual Category of Abuse of Process Contin-
ues to Shrink” (2002), 49 C.R. (5th) 87; L. Stuesser, “Abuse of Process: The Need to Reconsider” 
(1994), 29 C.R. (4th) 92. 
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  [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170.  
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  [2001] 3 S.C.R. 9. 
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  In 2001, the Ontario Court of Appeal released Oneil v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police 
Force (2001), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 59, which appeared to alter the test set out in Nelles by suggesting 
that in certain cases malice could be inferred from an absence of reasonable and probable grounds 
to commence or continue a prosecution. If the majority of the Court of Appeal did intend to lower 
the standard set in Nelles, they would certainly be at odds with the decisions in Proulx, Dix and 
now Krieger, all released after Oneil. Nevertheless, on March 27, 2003 the court released Folland 
v. Ontario (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 89 (Ont. C.A.), which relied both on Oneil and on Milgaard v. 
Kujawa (1994), 118 D.L.R. (4th) 653 (Sask. C.A.), among other cases, in holding that Nelles and 
Proulx did not settle the law as to whether Crown Attorneys may only be sued for malicious 
prosecution, and that actions for abuse of process, conspiracy to injure and intentional infliction of 
harm against Crowns may exist at law. This reasoning appears to go beyond the accepted interpre-
tation of Nelles and Proulx.  
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  Nelles, supra, note 49, at para. 50. 
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ceedings. In order to have reasonable and probable grounds a prosecutor must 
have:  
[a]n honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded 
on reasonable and probable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, 
which assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and 
cautious man, placed in the position of the accuser, to the conclusion that the per-
son charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed.53 
If a plaintiff can establish that the prosecutor did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe the accused was guilty, he or she must further 
prove that the prosecutor initiated or continued the proceedings motivated by 
malice, in the form of a deliberate and improper use of the office of the Attor-
ney General or Crown Attorney. As expressed by Lamer J.:  
This burden on the plaintiff amounts to a requirement that the Attorney General or 
Crown Attorney perpetrated a fraud on the process of criminal justice and in so do-
ing perverted or abused his office and the process of criminal justice. In fact, in 
some cases this would seem to amount to criminal conduct.54 
Interestingly, although the Supreme Court recognized the historical role of 
the Attorney General as legal adviser to the Crown, and the status of a Crown 
Attorney as a “minister of justice” in both Nelles and Proulx, it made no men-
tion of any historic legal foundation for these powers which formed the founda-
tion of the test for malicious prosecution.  
The Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the scope and meaning 
of prosecutorial discretion, Krieger, arose in an entirely unique context — 
professional disciplinary proceedings against a Crown Attorney. Krieger not 
only explicitly upholds the deferential standard set in Nelles and Power, but 
strengthens it by giving it a constitutional foundation. 
II.  KRIEGER V. LAW SOCIETY OF ALBERTA 
1. Facts 
Krieger, a Crown Attorney in Alberta, was assigned to prosecute a murder. 
Before the preliminary inquiry, he received the results of DNA and biological 
tests that implicated someone other than the accused. Ten days later, he advised 
the accused’s counsel that the results of the testing would not be available in 
time for the preliminary inquiry. After the first day of the inquiry, however, 
defence counsel learned that there were in fact preliminary test results that were 
                                                                                                                                                              
53
  Id., at para. 43. 
54
  Id., at paras. 45 and 46. 
(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) Constitutional Recognition 183 
 of the Role of the Attorney General 
 
favourable to his client. He complained to the Deputy Attorney General that 
there had been a lack of timely and adequate disclosure.  
After a review by the Attorney General, Krieger’s delay in disclosing the test 
results was found to be unjustified and he was reprimanded and removed from 
the case. The accused complained to the Law Society of Alberta about Krieg-
er’s conduct. Before the Law Society could conduct a review, Krieger sought 
an order that the Law Society had no jurisdiction to review the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion by a Crown Attorney and an order that the rule in the 
Code of Professional Conduct requiring a prosecutor to make timely disclosure 
to the accused or defence counsel was of no force and effect. 
The Court of Queen’s Bench dismissed Krieger’s application, holding that it 
was within the power of the province of Alberta to regulate lawyers and to 
delegate that authority to the Law Society. Also, as the rule at issue dealt only 
with matters of prosecutorial discretion where there were allegations of bad 
faith or dishonesty, it survived constitutional scrutiny. Justice MacKenzie 
rejected the argument that a Crown Attorney could only be disciplined by the 
Attorney General. He found that the Attorney General did not have the same 
duties to the public as the Law Society, which is charged with protecting the 
public from dishonest lawyers. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal overturned that decision. Although they found 
that the rule in question was intra vires the province, it did not give the Law 
Society the power to further investigate this particular complaint, as the inves-
tigation would necessarily entail a review of the Attorney General’s decision 
that there had been no dishonesty or bad faith in Krieger’s conduct. The rule at 
issue gave the Law Society the power to review prosecutorial decisions only in 
cases of bad faith. Because the Attorney General had determined there was no 
bad faith in this case, the Law Society was outside its jurisdiction in reviewing 
the matter. 
The Law Society’s appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
2. The Independence of the Attorney General 
Before turning to the substantive issues on the appeal, Iacobucci and Major 
JJ. reflected on the “unique and important role of the Attorney General and his 
agents as distinct from private lawyers.”55 They noted that the office of the 
Attorney General had changed little since its inception in 13th century England, 
and that its main function was, and is, the control of public and private prosecu-
tions. In Canada, they observed, the office is one with “constitutional dimen-
sions recognized in the Constitution Act, 1867.” Although the Court recognized 
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that the duties conventionally exercised by the modern Attorney General are 
not enumerated, they found that section 135 of the Act provided for the exten-
sion of the authority and duties of the Attorney General that existed prior to 
Confederation.56 Moreover, section 63 of the Constitution Act, 1867, also pro-
vides that the Attorney General must be included in the cabinets of Ontario and 
Quebec. 
The Court also acknowledged the advisory and political functions of the 
modern office of the Attorney General, and the expansive role Attorneys Gen-
eral play in government and the administration of justice. Nevertheless, the 
Court stated that the independence of the Attorney General lies in its power, to 
“bring, manage and terminate prosecutions”57 — a power of such gravity that it 
has created an expectation that the Attorney General will carry out this role 
“fully independent from the political pressures of government.”58 The Court 
observed that in the U.K. the fear of political pressure has been addressed 
by ensuring that the Attorney General does not sit as a member of Cabinet. As 
such, the dual role of the Canadian Attorney General makes the principle of 
independence in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion even more important 
than in Britain. It is so crucial in fact, that the Court declared: “it is a const i-
tutional principle in this country that the Attorney General must act inde-
pendently of partisan concerns when supervising prosecutorial decisions.”59 
The Court found support for its view in R. v. Regan,60 released seven months 
before Kreiger, and the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s seminal paper 
“Controlling Criminal Prosecutions in Canada.”61 Interestingly, although the 
Court relied on the dissent of Binnie J., in Regan, they declined to follow his 
lead and expressly declared the independence of the Attorney General to be a 
principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. In Regan, 
Binnie J. wrote: 
In R. v. G.D.B. … we held that “the right to effective assistance of counsel” in the 
criminal justice system reflects a principle of fundamental justice with the meaning 
of s. 7 of the Charter. The duty of a Crown Attorney to respect his or her “Minister 
of Justice” obligations of objectivity and independence is no less fundamental. It is 
an essential protection of the citizen against the sometimes overzealous or misdi-
rected exercise of state power. It is one of the more important checks and balances 
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of our criminal justice system and easily satisfies the criteria first established in Re 
B.C. Motor Vehicle Act…62 
Justices Iacobucci and Major also found the Attorney General’s independ-
ence to be rooted in its freedom from judicial interference arising from the 
“fundamental principle of the rule of law under our Constitution”63 as estab-
lished by the Court in R. v. Power. The independence of the Attorney General 
limits the court’s supervision of the Attorney General (Crown Attorney) to his 
or her conduct before the court and not his or her exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.  
In Krieger, the Court concluded its assessment of the role of the Attorney 
General by observing that:  
The quasi-judicial function of the Attorney General cannot be subjected to 
interference from parties who are not competent to consider the various factors 
involved in making a decision to prosecute. To subject such decisions to political 
interference, or to judicial supervision, could erode the integrity of our system of 
prosecution. Clear constitutional lines are necessary in areas subject to such grave 
potential conflict.64  
Whether the independence of the Attorney General will be elevated to a 
section 7 of the Charter principle of fundamental justice by a majority of the 
Court is a matter for future cases. Notably, a section 7 constitutional question 
was not stated in Krieger, and therefore the court focused on the constitutional 
principles involved in the separation and division of powers.  
Although the Court did not expressly frame it this way, Krieger appears to 
create a new unwritten constitutional principle which flows from the rule of 
law, and the fact that our Constitution is intended to be “similar in principle to 
that of United Kingdom:”65 the independence of the Attorney General in prose-
cutorial decision-making. While the appropriateness of recent judicial decisions 
based on unwritten constitutional principles set out in the preamble to the Con-
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  Regan, supra, note 48, at para. 157. 
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  Id., at para. 32. 
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  The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 states in part, “Whereas the Provinces of Can-
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stitution to create new “rights” can be questioned, particularly in the language 
rights sphere,66 constitutional recognition of a longstanding convention such as 
the independence of the Attorney General may be less controversial. This is 
especially so where the court has already recognized judicial independence to 
flow from the same constitutional principles.67 
The acceptance of the Attorney General’s independence as a constitutional 
principle is a positive development for the administration of justice — not only 
will the standards established by the Court in Nelles, Krieger and Power allow 
Attorneys General and Crown Attorneys to make decisions free from external 
pressures, they also ensure that those who are genuine victims of a malicious 
prosecution or abuse of process continue to have a remedy at law.68 
3. Krieger and the Division of Powers 
Arguably, recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the scope of the federal 
government’s criminal law power under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act 
have expanded what was traditionally viewed as criminal law through the 
inclusion of matters such as environmental regulation and tobacco advertising 
within the ambit of criminal law.69 This does not mean, however, that the pro-
vincial power to regulate local matters has been decreasing. While the Court, as 
it stated in the Reference re Firearms Act (Can.),70 will not hesitate to strike 
down legislation that is not validly criminal law, increasingly, the focus of 
division of powers analysis is the question of “express conflict” between over-
lapping provincial and federal spheres of legislative responsibility. That is, only 
where federal and provincial laws expressly conflict, in that compliance with 
one would involve the breach of the other, will the court find an inconsistency, 
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70
  [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783. 
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and trigger the doctrine of paramountcy.71 The division of powers analysis in 
Krieger follows this formula insofar as it seeks to recognize the “co-existence” 
of both federal and provincial roles in the area of criminal law and the admin-
istration of justice as they relate to the regulation of lawyers.  
Krieger challenged the Law Society’s jurisdiction to discipline him by alleg-
ing that Rule 28(d) of the Law Society of Alberta’s Code of Professional Con-
duct was an “unconstitutional regulation by the province of criminal law and 
procedure”72 and thus encroached on the federal government’s power in section 
91(27). The Supreme Court found, however, that the impugned rule involved 
both federal and provincial matters. While provincial regulations establishing 
guidelines for the conduct of a lawyer in a criminal trial might have some im-
pact on criminal procedure, in “pith and substance” such regulations were 
within the provincial sphere. The provincial heads of authority to legislate 
regarding matters involving “property and civil rights” (section 92(13)) and 
“the administration of justice” (section 92(14)) included the power to licence 
and regulate lawyers, and review their alleged breaches of ethics.73 
In determining that the impugned rule was a matter of professional discipline 
and not criminal law or procedure, the Court noted that the rule was situated in 
the Alberta Code of Professional Conduct, the purpose of which was to govern 
the ethical conduct of lawyers; that Benchers were authorized to establish an 
ethics code for members by the Legal Profession Act; that the commentary of 
the rule specifically noted that its application was limited to circumstances 
where a prosecutor acted dishonestly or in bad faith and that it was not intended 
to interfere with prosecutorial discretion;74 and the examples in the commentary 
demonstrate that the rule is not intended to interfere with the disclosure obliga-
tions set out in the Supreme Court’s ruling in R. v. Stinchcombe.75  
The Court also found that the Law Society had the general power to regulate 
all lawyers in the province — including Crown Attorneys. Justices Iacobucci 
and Major disagreed with the Alberta Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the 
Law Society could not review Krieger’s conduct because the Attorney General 
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188  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
had already investigated the matter and found that Krieger did not act in bad 
faith. It was their view that a review by the Attorney General and a review by 
the Law Society were two very different inquiries. In effect, the Court found 
that a Crown Attorney had two masters — he or she was required to meet the 
departmental standards set by his or her employer, the Attorney General, and he 
or she was also required to be a member of the Law Society, and thus was 
required to follow its ethical guidelines: 
The Attorney General is responsible for determining the policies of Crown prosecu-
tors. The Law Society is responsible for enforcing the ethical standards required of 
lawyers. Certain aspects of a Crown prosecutor’s conduct may trigger a review by 
the Attorney General and other aspects, usually ethical conduct considerations, may 
mean a review by the Law Society. A prosecutor whose conduct so contravenes 
professional ethical standards that the public would be best served by preventing 
him or her from practicing law in any capacity in the province should not be im-
mune from disbarment. Only the Law Society can protect the public in this way.76 
Consequently, the Supreme Court permitted the Law Society to review 
Krieger’s conduct to determine whether he had acted beyond the scope of his 
prosecutorial duties by exercising his discretion dishonestly or in bad faith.77 If 
dishonesty or bad faith in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is uncovered, 
the Law Society may proceed with disciplinary proceedings. However, if there 
is no evidence that the Crown Attorney’s prosecutorial discretion was exercised 
improperly, the Law Society may not proceed any further with its review.  
When considering the content and parameters of prosecutorial discretion, 
Iacobucci and Major JJ. were quick to point out that the term does not encom-
pass every decision made by a Crown prosecutor. It refers specifically to “those 
powers that constitute the core of the Attorney General’s office and which are 
protected from the influence of improper political and other vitiating factors by 
the principle of independence,”78 including the “discretion exercised by the 
Attorney-General in matters within his authority in relation to the prosecution 
of criminal offences.”79  
Prosecutorial discretion, the Court concluded, includes decisions that deal 
with the nature and extent of a prosecution such as: the discretion whether to 
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bring the prosecution of a charge laid by the police; the discretion to enter a 
stay of proceedings in either a private or public prosecution; the discretion to 
accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge; the discretion to withdraw from criminal 
proceedings altogether; and the discretion to take control of a private prosecu-
tion. Decisions that involve the actual conduct of the case before the court, such 
as pre-trial disclosure or the methods employed in cross-examination, do not 
fall within “prosecutorial discretion,” and are governed by the inherent jurisdic-
tion of the court to control its own processes (i.e., abuse of process).80 
The Court also observed that while such decisions are not entirely immune 
from review, they are entitled to deference:  
In our theory of government, it is the sovereign who holds the power to prosecute 
his or her subjects. A decision of the Attorney General, or of his or her agents, 
within the authority delegated to him or her by the sovereign is not subject to inter-
ference by other arms of government. An exercise of prosecutorial discretion will, 
therefore, be treated with deference by the courts and by other members of the ex-
ecutive, as well as statutory bodies like provincial law societies.81 
It was recognized that discretionary decisions are essential to the efficiency 
of the criminal justice system but because courts will afford them a great deal 
of deference, they must be exercised with “objectivity and dispassion.”82 Courts 
are entitled to review decisions of the Attorney General or his or her agents in 
cases of “flagrant impropriety” or where malice in the course of a prosecution 
is shown, because in these situations, a prosecutor is acting “beyond the scope 
of his office as protected by the constitutional principle and the justification for 
such deference will have evaporated.”83 
Similar principles applied to review by provincial law societies, only insofar as 
it is shown that a prosecutor has exercised his or her prosecutorial discretion in 
bad faith, or for improper purpose, because actions carried out in such a way 
mean the Attorney General or Crown Attorney are acting beyond his or her 
scope of authority.  
The Court illustrated its analysis through the example of the legal obligation of 
a Crown prosecutor to disclose all relevant information to the defence in a crimi-
nal trial. While the Crown retains the discretion not to disclose irrelevant infor-
mation, there is no discretion regarding the disclosure of relevant information 
save for privilege and timing issues. If there was an alleged breach of the duty to 
disclose, a law society must be permitted to review the matter to determine prima 
facie whether it was done in bad faith or for improper purpose and thus outside of 
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the powers of the prosecutor. It is only in those instances that a Law Society, like a 
court, would be allowed to interfere.84 
III.  THE INDEPENDENCE “SPECTRUM” 
When compared with other types of independence with constitutional or 
quasi-constitutional dimensions, the independence of the Attorney General 
appears to fall between judicial independence and tribunal independence.  
It is clear that the Attorney General and his or her agents do not enjoy the 
hallmarks of independence enjoyed by the judiciary such as security of tenure, 
financial security or institutional independence from government.85 As 
discussed above, the Attorney General is accountable to Parliament, or the 
appropriate legislature for the decisions he or she makes.86 And even though the 
Attorney General is intended to be independent from other members of the 
executive and the Cabinet, such independence may be difficult to exercise in 
practice. As the Law Reform Commission of Canada reminds us, the Attorney 
General is appointed by the Prime Minister or a Premier, and could be stripped 
of his or her Cabinet post for acting against the advice of Cabinet.87  
Although agents of the Attorney General, the security of tenure and financial 
security of Crown Attorneys is more similar to any other government employee 
than the judiciary, as a prosecutor can be dismissed if he or she fails to live up 
to his or her employment obligations.88 However, due to the high level of defer-
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only after he or she has already exercised his or her prosecutorial discretion — e.g., in the form of 
questions in the House regarding a high-profile case. Therefore, the legislative branch of govern-
ment cannot be said to have the power to interfere with the decisions made by a prosecutor on a 
day-to-day basis.  
87
  In his article “The Role of the Attorney General and the Charter of Rights,” supra, note 8, 
Ian Scott recognized that independence from other members of Cabinet in determining prosecution 
policy was an important consideration for an Attorney General. For instance, Scott noted that it has 
been suggested that an Attorney General would also be required to take legal action against a fellow 
minister if he or she were convinced that a course of action was unconstitutional and was otherwise 
unable to prevent it. This was also recognized by the LRC, supra, note 11, at 10-11. This may be 
one factor the Court considered in Krieger when it noted that “membership in the Cabinet makes 
the principle of independence in prosecutorial functions perhaps even more important in this 
country than in the U.K..”  
88
  In Ontario, government lawyers are not covered by labour relations statutes. Some protec-
tion in this regard is afforded by the requirement that the government employer follow the hiring 
practices and grievance processes set out in agreements with government lawyers. Salaries are also 
a matter of negotiation between the representatives of government lawyers and their employers, and 
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ence courts afford prosecutorial discretion in both abuse of process and mali-
cious prosecution cases, Crown Attorneys would appear to enjoy more protec-
tion from interference by the judicial branch of government. As a result, Crown 
Attorneys may make decisions in individual cases free from unwarranted scru-
tiny from outside sources, or fear of the same (“the Chill Factor” as the trial 
judge in Krieger referred to it).89 
In contrast, although administrative tribunals are subject to statutory and 
common law principles of fairness and natural justice, they are not entitled as a 
constitutional principle to the hallmarks of independence. In the recent decision 
of Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager Liquor Con-
trol Licensing Branch),90 the Supreme Court noted that tribunals are bodies 
created by the legislative branch of government, and as such, unless adminis-
trative proceedings engage constitutional rights, it is the role of the legislature 
to determine relationship between the tribunal and the executive, and the 
degree of independence required of a particular tribunal.91  
The Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning judicial independence and the 
independence of the Attorney General demonstrate that both concepts have 
similar constitutional origins in that both receive some “textual recognition”92 
in the provisions of the Constitution, but their main foundations lie outside the 
express sections of the Constitution in the principle of the rule of law,93 and the 
notion that Canada is to have a Constitution “similar in Principle to that of the 
United Kingdom.”94 Conversely, administrative tribunals lack any constitution-
al distinction from the executive and are in fact, instruments for the implemen-
tation of government policy.95  
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF KRIEGER 
In Krieger the Supreme Court has clearly enshrined the independence of the 
Attorney General in prosecutorial discretion in the Canadian Constitution. 
                                                                                                                                                              
in some instances disputes over salaries can go to binding arbitration. This process, of course, is far 
different from the process used to determine judicial salaries. 
89
  Krieger v. The Law Society of Alberta, [1997] A.J. No. 689, at para. 10. 
90
  [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781. 
91
  Ocean Port, supra, note 90, at para. 20. 
92
  Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, at para. 29. As noted above, there is some ac-
knowledgment of the office of the Attorney General in ss. 34, 63, 134, and 135 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867. Similarly, judicial independence finds some recognition in the judicature provisions of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 (ss. 96 to 101) and in the Charter (s. 11(d)). 
93
  Preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
94
  Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867. 
95
  Ocean Port, supra, note 90, at para. 24. 
192  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Thus, only a very limited range of cases can be properly brought before a 
provincial law society, namely where the prosecutor has acted dishonestly or in 
bad faith. “Bad faith” in this context goes well beyond negligence and requires 
conscious and deliberate wrongdoing.96 Given the recentness of the decision, it 
is too early to tell if provincial law societies will experience an increase in the 
number of complaints and discipline proceedings involving Crown Attorneys. 
It is hoped that such proceedings will not be used as a vehicle to chill the 
independent exercise of prosecutorial discretion and further, that law societies 
act in a manner that dissuades improper claims. It is also open to law societies 
to work with Attorneys General and other interested parties to create a protocol 
which would ensure that only appropriate cases are brought before professional 
discipline committees. 
Krieger effectively upholds the Nelles and Power standards of “improper 
purpose” or “flagrant impropriety” and applies them to professional discipline 
proceedings. Since Nelles was released in 1989, there have only been two cases 
in Canada (Proulx and Dix v. Canada (Attorney General))97 in which the 
plaintiffs in malicious prosecution actions have been successful.98 Although it 
appears that the number of malicious prosecution cases instituted is on the rise, 
in Ontario such actions very rarely go to trial. Typically, they are withdrawn, 
abandoned or dismissed on a summary judgment motion. Given the seriousness 
of the allegations raised in malicious prosecution actions, both for the 
individual and the general office of the Crown Attorney, the Ontario Ministry 
of the Attorney General takes these cases seriously. The approach taken is 
intended to dissuade frivolous litigants and ensure that Crown counsel can 
pursue prosecutions without fear of retribution by accused persons or their 
counsel.  
As with malicious prosecution actions, it is hoped that the nature of Law 
Society authority will allow Crown Attorneys to carry on with their duties 
without fear of illegitimate claims, while still protecting the interests of 
individuals who come into contact with the criminal justice system. As noted 
by the trial judge in Krieger: 
[w]hen the steps that are required to deal a complaint to the Law Society are 
considered it must be said that the hurdles to be jumped and the hoops to be dived 
                                                                                                                                                              
96
  This proposition relies on a traditional interpretation of “bad faith,” such as the one in 
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., “not simply bad judgment or negligence but rather it implies the 
conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.” To give true effect to 
the meaning and spirit of Krieger, it may be prudent for law societies to include a definition of “bad 
faith” in their codes of professional ethics. 
97
  2002 ABQB 580. 
98
  A lack of success that Kent Roach, a strong critic of the scope of prosecutorial discretion, 
calls “the failed promise of malicious prosecution suits.” Roach, supra, note 68, at 12. 
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through are at least as onerous as those a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution 
faces.99 
At the end of the day, Krieger’s most important legacy will be its recognition 
of the independence of the Attorney General in prosecutorial decision-making 
as a principle of Canadian constitutional law. It will also be viewed as a contin-
uation of the Supreme Court’s deference to decisions made by prosecutors. The 
Supreme Court’s persistent application of a deferential standard as evidenced in 
the malicious prosecution cases continues to be applied in disciplinary cases. 
For Crown Attorneys, this means they will be able to carry out their responsi-
bilities effectively without interference from those less qualified to make prose-
cutorial decisions.  
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  Krieger, 2002 SCC 65, at 51. 
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